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NOTE AND COMMENT 
Tar: P£RMANSNT INT£RNATIONAr. CoURT oii JusT1cr:.-For the first time 
in history leading powers both great and small have been able to agree upon 
a plan for an international court of justice. The plan was formulated last 
summer by an advisory committee of jurists sitting at The Hague. Since 
then it has been submitted to the Council and the Assembly of the League 
of Nations and has been approved. It will come into operation as soon as 
the project has been ratified by a majority of the nations belonging to the 
League.1 
The Pern1anent Court of International Justice, as it is called, will be 
more than a mere panel from which arbitration tribunals may be constituted 
from time to time, and it will be much less than a supreme court of the world. 
It will t>e more than a mere panel of arbitrators because it is to be a per-
manent institution established to develop and apply rules of law. It will 
1 The text of the project with a commentary by J. B. Scott may be found in 
Pamphlet No. 35 recently issued by the Division of International Law of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. Other data taken from current periodicals and 
press reports. 
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be less than a supreme court because, as approved by the League, it is to 
have no obligatory jurisdiction. The draft-scheme provides for organization, 
competence, and procedure. The procedure is to be very simple and in gen-
eral much like the system already developed in arbitrations at The Hague. 
There will be written proceedings, consisting of the submission of cases, 
counter-cases, and, if necessary, replies, and also oral proceedings consisting 
of the hearing of witnesses, experts, agents, and counsel. Details of pro-
cedure are wisely left to be settled by the Court itself. Decisions are to be 
made by majority vote; the judgment must state the reasons upon which 
it is based; dissenting judges may have the fact of their dissent, but not 
their reasons, recorded in the judgment. 
The matter of competence is more important. It was readily agreed 
that the Court should decide cases submitted by the parties under general or 
special convention. It was also agreed that in the absence of general or 
special convention, jurisdiction should be limited to disputes of a justiciable 
nature between states which the states themselves are unable to settle by 
diplomacy. Should jurisdiction within these limits be obligatory or volun-
tary? The· advisory committee recommended obligatory jurisdiction in all 
controversies of a legal nature involving (a) the interpretation of a treaty, 
(b) any question of international law, (c) the existence of any fact which, 
if established, would constitute a bre~ch of an international obligation, (d) 
the nature or extent of reparation to be made for the breach of an interna-
tional obligation, and (e) the interpretation of a sentence passed by the 
Court. The recommendation was well received by the smaller nations. It 
was opposed by the great powers, however, and the project was finally 
approved with the obligatory feature eliminated. The five categories provide 
an admirable enumeration of the kinds of controversy which the Court is 
specially qualified to decide, but the submission of such controversies remains 
optional with the parties. The Court is to apply, in the order named, 
treaties, custom, general principles of law common to all civilized peoples, 
and the judicial decisions and juristic writings of the various nations. It is 
also required to give advisory opinions on questions referred to it by the 
League Council or Assembly. 
The real difficulty, and one which threatened to prove insuperable, was 
the problem of the Court's composition. There are great powers and small 
powers, strong powers and weak powers, powers which ~re advanced in the 
civilization which is characteristic of the twentieth century and others which 
are backward. The great powers will never submit to any tribunal domi-
nated by the small, weak, and backward. The lesser powers know all too 
well the dangers that inhere in the predominance of the great. How may 
a trib'unal be constituted among the fifty or more nations of the eartlT which 
will satisfy the strong, safeguard the weak, be fairly representative,. and yet 
be small enough to function as a court? This problem prevented agreement 
upon a plan before the werld war. It threatened to disrupt the advisory 
committee in 1920. The committee's membership was divided equally betwetn 
nationals of great and small powers. Members from the more powerful 
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states contended for permanent representation on the proposed court for 
the great powers. Members from the smaller states insisted upon equality. 
Elihu Root, in what may some day be regarded as the crowning achievement 
of his career, piloted the committee to a satisfactory compromise. Taking 
advantage of the existing League organization, and ably seconded by Lord 
Phillimore, Mr. Root proposed a small court elected by the concurrent vote 
of the League Council, in which the great powers are dominant, and the 
~eague Assembly, in which all powers are represented equally. This pro-
posal was accepted and became the basis for the plan eventually adopted. 
The Court will consist at the outset of fifteen members, eleven judges 
and four deputy judges. The members are to be elected from a list of can· 
didates nominated by the national groups which constitute the panel of the 
so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration. Each national group may nomi· 
nate two candidates. If the Council and Assembly fail to agree on fifteen 
members after three sittings, a small conference committee, called a Com-
mittee of Mediation, will attempt to agree upon candidates to be recom-
mended for the unfilled positions. If this does not result in an election, the 
members already elected to the Court may fill the vacancies by selection 
from among the candidates who have received votes in either the Coundl 
or the Assembly. Election is for nine years and members are eligible for 
reelection. While national political office is declared incompatible with a 
position on the Court, it seems to have been the opinion of the advisory 
committee that this should not disqualify members of national courts or 
legislative bodies. If a state which is party to a controversy submitted to 
the Court has no national on the Court, it is assured the right to name a 
judge who shall sie during the trial and disposition of that particular con-
troversy. The Court will sit at The Hague. 
The plan naturally makes a few concessions to the civil law countries 
for which the justification is none too obvious to lawyers trained in a dif-
ferent system. There are several features which seem open to criticism, 
notably the provision which makes French the sole official language and the 
method of nominating candidates. These, however, are after all secondary 
matters which may be amended as experience suggests. "The project on the 
whole is a remarkable one and one that 9-oes credit to the sagacity and states-
manship of the jurists who labored on the advisory committee. This project 
alone, it is believed, would more than justify the retention of the existing 
organization of the League. ' E. D. D. 
Pruce REGULATION BY TH:€ STATE AND !N'r€RSTAT:€ CoMM€RCE.-The liti-
gation which has resulted from a recent attempt of the State of Indiana to 
regulate the price of coal should lead to a determination of the extent of 
three important but very general principles of police power. The first and 
most important of these, from the point of view of this discussion, is that 
the State has the power to regulate returns of businesses "affected with a 
public interest." In the first attack upon the Indiana law, it was held that 
the business of mining and selling coal under existing economic conditions 
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was within this class.1 At this time, the commission created by the act had 
not entered upon the performance of its duties and several questions arising 
under sections of the bill concerning these duties were deemed premature. 
These sections, however, and subsequent orders of the commission pursuant 
thereto, have raised: the question as to the extent of the remaining principles 
referred to. The first of these is that the State may do whatever is reason-
ably necessary to render effective a valid exercise of the police power. The 
other is. that an otherwise valid exercise of the police power may he sus-
tained, despite the fact that it incidentally interferes with interstate com-
merce, in the absence of conflicting Federal legislation. The language in 
which these principles have been stated in numerous cases, literally applied, 
would sustain the provisions of the Indiana law under discussion. It may 
be conceded at once, however, that they have never been applied to a situa-
tion closely analogous to that which arises under the coal law. 
In order to prevent reducing to a nullity the power to -regulate prices, 
the law attempts to insure an available supply of coal at the prices fixed by 
empowering the commission to apportion among the operators the amount 
necessary for domestic purposes, except for manufacturing, and to require 
each to produce and offer for sale each month his proportion of the whole, 
with forfeiture of the license provided for by the act as a penalty for dis-
qbeying the orders of the commission, and a severe penalty for mining coal 
without a license. The validity of this portion of the act was successfully 
attacked in Vandalia Coal Co. v. The Special Coal and Food Commission of 
Indiana,• the District Court of the United States for the district of Indiana 
holding that these sections of the act constituted a direct interference with 
interstate commerce, inasmuch as coal severed from the ground becomes an 
article of commerce and the owner of the commodity has a right, so far as 
the State is concerned, to sell and to contract to sell his entire output to 
citizens of other States, and that this right cannot be interfered with by 
compelling the sale of a certain amount in the State. The court also indi-
cated that, aside from the interstate commerce question, the State has no 
power to compel the production and sale of coal by imposing the alternative 
of quitting business. 
Before the principle relating to interstate commerce can become involved, 
there must obviously be an otherwise valid exercise of the police power 
which affects interstate commerce incidentally. So here, the question as to 
the validity of compulsory production and sale, enforced through the alter-
native of compelling a cessation of the business of mining, must be deter-
mined in favor of the State before it becomes worth while to consider the 
effect on interstate commerce. In view of the evident purpose of these 
sections of the act to make price regulation a benefit rather than a detri-
ment to the people of the State, their validity would seem to depend on the 
application of the second principle: whether they can be said to be reason-
ably necessary to make effective a valid exercise of the police power. 
1 American Coal Mining Co. v. Special Coal and Food Commission of Indiana, --
Fed. -- ·en. C. Ind., Sept. 6th, 1920). Discussed in 19 ll!xcn. L. REY. 74. 
•-- Fed. -- (D. C. Ind., Nov. 27th, 1920). 
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Examples of the applications of this principle which seem to bear directly 
upon the present problem are to be found in the cases of New York ex rel. 
Sil:: v. Hesterburg," and Sligli v. Kirkie:ood! In the former, a law providing 
a punishment for the possession of imported game during the closed season 
was held valid in order to protect the local game, admittedly a valid exercise 
of the police power. In the latter, a Florida statute prohibiting the shipment 
of unripe citrus fruits out of the State, in order to protect the citrus fruit 
industry of the State, was upheld. These cases illustrate the principle. 
Conceding that the business of mining and selling coal is "affected with a 
public interest,'' so that prices may be regulated," the valid exercise of the 
police power exists. To sustain these measures, it must be shown that they 
are reasonably necessary in order to render price regulation effective. It 
requires little imagination to predict the result of a measure providing 
merely for the regulation of the price of coal, with no means of compelling 
the sale of coal at that price. Coal in the particular State would simply dis-
appear from the market, either going to States where the seller is not com-
pelled to accept reasonable prices for his product, or, wh~re possible, being 
stored until the iaw is recognized as an economic impossibility, and prices, 
of necessity, rise to their old level. Nearly three hundred years ago Parlia-
ment pas"Sed a law" providing for the regulation of the price of coal in 
London, and included the following remedy for an anticipated result: "And 
if any ingrosser or retailer of such coal shall refuse to sell as aforesaid, 
that then the said Lord Mayor and aldermen and justices· of peace respec-
tively are hereby authorized: to appoint and impower such officer or officers 
or other persons as they shall think fit to enter into any wharf or other 
place where such coals are stored up ; and in case of refusal taking a con-
stable to force entrance, and the said coals to sell or cause to be sold at 
such rates as the said Lord Mayor and aldermen and justices respectively 
shall judge reasonable, rendering to such ingrosser or retailer the money 
for which the said coals shall be so sold, necessary charges being deducted." 
Certainly there is some ground to support the conclusion of the legislature 
as expressed in the act, that the measures are reasonably necessary to the 
accomplishment! of the principal purpose of the act, and the Supreme Court 
has said,' "If no state of circumstances could exist to justify such a statute, 
then we may declare this one void, because in excess of the legislative power 
of the State. But if it could, we must presume it did." 
If the requirement of compulsory production and offer for sale, enforced 
through the alternative previously referred to, can be sustained under this 
principle, a power of the State, valueless alone, becomes valuable, and the 
State has a means of protecting its people from extortion on the part of 
• 211 u. s. 31, 
• 237 u. s. 52. 
•For the purpose of this discussion, it is assumed throughout that the first case 
involving the law was correctly decided and that the Supreme Court will affirm the 
power of the State to regulate the price of coal. 
• 16 & 17 CAR. II, c. 2 (1661). Also 2 W. & M., c. 7 (1690), and 7 & 8. WM, III, 
c. 36, (1696). 
• )lunn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. n3; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769. 
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those controlling the supply of a necessity. Is the part of the power which 
makes the whole worth utilizing, being sustainable as an exercise of the 
police power, to be rendered invalid because the entire production of coal 
within the State cannot be shipped in interstate commerce if the act is 
enforced, without subjecting the operators to the penalty of retiring? The 
only principle which seems to offer any hope for the act is the third of those 
already referred to, that an otherwise valid use of the police power is not 
invalid although it interferes with interstate commerce, provided the inter-
ference is incidental and there is no Federal law conflicting. 
The basis upon which the legislature proceeds is a recognition in the 
act" that the coal deposits of the State are sufficient to supply all legitimate 
demands of intra- and interstate commerce for decades to come, and any 
in~ention of prohibiting the sale or transportation of coal in interstate com-
merce is disavowed. The evil which the law seeks to combat is not the 
shortage of supply, but extortionate charges. The purpose is not that the 
State should obtain a larger supply of its coal than before, at the expense of 
other States, but that the regulation of prices may not become futile by 
driving the commodity away from the local markets. The interference is 
incidental, therefore, at least in the sense that it is not the primary purpose 
of the act. 
Moreover, if the statement of the legislature concerning the deposits of 
the State is to be taken at face value; the quantum of interference may not 
be great. It is easily conceivable that in many instances individual operators 
might be unable· to dispose of their entire output in interstate commerce, 
however much they might .desire to do so. However, there may be numer-
ous other cases where the operator could dispose of his entire production 
in interstate commerce if he were free to do so. Here there would be an 
undoubted interference. 
What is the meaning of the term "incidental" as used in cases where 
the principle has been laid down? The cases in which some form of the 
proposition has been stated are innumerable, but few of them are of any 
value in the present discussion, and none is closely analogous. Two very 
small groups of cases approach the question from opposite sides, but there 
is a ·wide gap between, and somewhere in that gap lies the solution of this 
problem. In the one group are such cases as Geer v. Connecticut;• New York 
er rel. Silz v. Hesterburg, supra; Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter,10 and 
Sligh v. Kirkwood, supra. In the other are West v. Kansas NatHral Gas 
Co.;u Haskell v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.;D Corwin v. Indiana, etc., Mining 
Co.," and perhaps Leisy v. Hardin" and Scholle11burger v. Penna." 
8 Act Creating a Special Coal and Food Commission of Indiana, Section ro. 
"r61 U. S. 6rg. 
10 .:ZOI) U. S. 341>• 
ll .:Z2I U. S • .:Z21). 
12 .:Z.:24 u. s . .:z17. 
18 120 Ind. 575. 
" 135 U. S. 100. 
:II I?I U. S. I. 
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Geer v. Connecticut and New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterburg deal with 
statutes enacted for the protection of game, a valid exercise of the police 
power. In; the first case, a statute forbidding the shipping of game out of 
the State during certain seasons of the year was sustained. The second has 
already been discussed. In both the objection was made that the statutes 
directly interfered with interstate commerce. In both the statutes were sus-
tained because the interference was held to be incidental. 
In Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, a New Jersey statute forbidding the 
piping of water out: of the State was sustained as a valid exercise of the 
police power and an incidental interference with interstate commerce. In 
Sligh v. Kirkwood, a Florida statute already discussed was sustained on the 
ground thatl the protection of the citrus fruit industry of the State was a 
valid exercise of the police power and that the interference with interstate 
commerce was incidental. 
All of these can be differentiated from the case of coat_. The game and 
water cases can be distinguished on the ground that the owner in both cases 
has but a qualified property right. Sligh v. Kirkwood can be differentiated 
on the ground that it is within the power of the State to say that unripe fruit 
is not a legitimate article of commerce. 
A discussion of West v. Kansas Natitral Gas Co. sufficiently covers the 
principle for which the other group stands. The State of Oklahoma had 
passed an act prohibiting the piping of oil and gas out of the State for the 
purpose of conserving the supply for its own people. The Supreme Court 
of the United States held (three justices dissenting) that the act was a direct 
interference with interstate commerce and invalid. The following proposi-
tions were quoted with approval: "No State, by the exercise of, or by the 
refusal to exercise, any or all of its powers, may prevent or unreasonably 
burden interstate commerce within its borders in any sound article thereof. 
No State, by the exercise of, or by the refusal to exercise, any or all of its 
powers, may substantially discriminate against or directly regulate interstate 
commerce or the right to carry it on." This case limits the principle upon 
which the coat law depends. However advantageous it may be to the people 
of a State to retain within its borders a natural resource, it cannot be done. 
Between the two _groups of cases there seems to be a wide gap, and ~t is 
believed that the Indiana law will fall somewhere within that gap. In order 
to be iustained it must be differentiated from the second group of cases. 
Two distinctions at once suggest themselves. The primary purpose of the 
Oklahoma law was to prohibit the exportation of the resource. The primary 
purpose of !the Indiana law is to make price regulation a benefit and not a 
detriment to the people of the State. Then, too, there is an obvious distinc-
tion in the quantum of the interference. The Oklahoma interference was 
complete. The Indiana interference may be very slight. 
In New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterburg, Justice Day distinguished the 
case at bar from Scliolleuburger v. Penna., where a law prohibiting the impor-
tation of oleomargarine, a legitimate article of commerce, was held invalid, 
though for the purpose of protecting the welfare of the people of the State, 
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on the ground that in the latter case the interference was the direct purpose 
of the act, whereas in the former the purpose was the protection of the local 
game and the interference was incidental. The language of the court, both 
in this case and in Sligh v. Kirkwood, seems to indicate that the term inci-
dental refers, not to the quanfum of the interference, but to the primary 
purpose. If this is the test to be applied, the Indiana law is clearly distin-
guishable from the Oklahoma law. From the legalistic standpoint, the ques-
tion would seem to be rather doubtful, with no case directly in point or very 
close. Language is to be found in the two widely divergent groups of cases 
which mark the bounds within which the question falls, tending to support 
the law on the one hand and perhaps to declare it invalid on ·the other. 
Inasmuch as the Supreme Court found sufficient merit in the Oklahoma law 
to result in a split, there would seem to be at lea.?t a fighting chance for the 
Indiana law. 
On the economic side, the case for the law may be summed up as fol..: 
lows : The starting point is: The State has the power to regulate the price 
of coal. In the absence of regulation a certain amount of coal is being sup-
plied to the people of the State at extortionate prices. If the same amount 
of coal can be obtained at the reasonable price set by the State, the people 
will be greatly benefited and: the people of adjoining States will not be harmed. 
If coal cannot be obtained at the price set by the State, the law will, of 
course, be extremely detrimental. P~ovided the State is to have the power 
of regulating prices at all, and provided it confines itself to the necessities 
of the case, why should it not be able to interfere with interstate commerce 
to that extent. The principle that an otherwise ·valid exercise of the police 
power can be sustained, though it incidentally interferes with interstate 
commerce developed when the conception of the police power was confined 
to health, morals and safety. Since then the police power has developed 
considerably beyond that conception. Logically, it follows that the princi-
ples which developed in the early conceptio~ of the.police power and fur-
thered the effectiveness of its exercise should not stand· still, but should be 
extended into new fields when the necessity arises. A. W. B. 
Vor.uN'l'ARY PAROI. TRUS'l' WI'l'H IMPI.Ir;D Powi;:R OF Ri;:vocATION.-In the 
recent case of Rnssell!s E~ecutors v. Passmore, 103 S. E. 652, in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, it appeared that the donor had made a volun-
tary transfer of certain bank stock about six months before his death. Sev-
eral years later, the donee having died without making any disposition of 
the stock, the donor's infant children brought suit in the name of their guar-
dian against the donee's executors to establish an alleged secret parol trust 
of the stock. There were two reputable witnesses who knew something 
about the transaction. One of them, who was present and participated in 
the initial transfer of the stock, testified that the stock was to be held "in 
the event of the donor's death" for the benefit of the donor's eldest son. The 
other witness, who was the donor's administrator and was present at his 
death, testified that the donor said a few hours before his death that the 
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stock was held by the donee for the benefit of the donor·s children. There 
was also testimony by an employee of the dance that the donee had said a 
few months before his death that he had some money for the donor's chil-
dren. And it appeared that on three occasions prior to his death the donee 
had made remittances for the donor's children. On the strength of this evi-
dence, the court held that the original transfer was an executed gift in trust 
for the oldest son, that this gift was conditioned by an implied· power of 
revocation, and that the original trust was later partially revoked and a 
different and enlarged trust created for the benefit of a11 the children. 
The implied power of revocation in this case must be supported solely 
by the testimony of the witness who participated in the initial transfer. The 
donor's declaration a few hours before death, remittances made by the 
donee under circumstances which tended to indicate that they were intended 
for a11 the children and the employee's testimony as to the donee's admission 
a few months before death are a11 inadmissible to· show such an implied 
power. They may be admitted to show that the stock continued to be held 
in trust, or that the original trust, if ·revocable, had been revoked and another 
created in its stead. But they are inadmissible to show that the initial trans-
fer was intended to be revocable under the settled principle of evidence that 
statements made by the transferrer, after transfer of title, are not receivable 
as admissions against the transferee. Tierney v. Fitzpatrick, I95 N. Y. 433; 
2 WIGMORE ON Ev1n£NCE, § Io85. It must be asEumed, therefore, that a 
power of revocation was implied in reliance upon the testimony that the 
stock was to be held "in the event of the donor's death" for the benefit of 
the eldest son. The opinion makes it reasonably clear that the revocability 
of the original trust was based upon this. testimony. 
As a general rule, a trust once completely and validly created, whether 
by a simple declaration of trust or by transfer in trust, and whether gra-
tuitous or for consideration, cannot be revoked unless a power of revocation 
has been reserved. Viney v. Abbott, I09 Mass. 300; Eu>ing v. Warner, 47 
Minn. 446; I PERRY ON TRusTs [6th ed.], § 104 There seems, however, to 
have been a slight reaction at some points from the liberality with which 
voluntary trusts were formerly enforced. Fo11owing E~ parte Pye, JS Ves. 
I40, there was at _first an inclination to tor~ure imperfect gifts into declara-
tions of trust and enforce them as such. Morgan v. 'Malleson, 10 Eq. 475. 
But this inclination was soon repudiated, and it became well settled that an 
imperfect gift will not be given effect as a declaration of trust. Cardo:Ja v. 
Leveroni., 233 Mass. 310; ScoTT's CAs:ES ON TRUSTS, I5I, note. In a few 
instances voluntary trusts which are formally perfect have been held revo-
cable. In the so-catted savings bank trust cases, instead of regarding a 
deposit in a savings bank in the depositor's name in trust for another as an 
irrevocable trust, courts have frequently treated it as a tentative trust or 
trust with implied power of revocation. fo re Totten, I79 N. Y. 112; Walso 
v. Lattemcr, 143 Minn. 364; 4 MINN. L. Rsv. 56. See ScoTT's CAS£S ON TRUSTS, 
224, note. Compare Ca::alis v. Ingraham., no Atl. (Me.) 359; I9 MICH. L. 
REv. 356. This anomalous result seems to be justified, however, if it can 
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be justified at ·all, by factors which are more or less peculiar to savings bank 
deposits in trust. See Beaver v. Beaver, II7 N. Y. 421, 430-r. Voluntary 
transfers in trust have been treated as revocable in a number of cases. 
There have been cases of voluntary settlement or gift in trust without express 
power of revocation in which the court has seemed to place upon the bene-
ficiary the burden of proving that the donor intended to make the gift irre-
vocable. See Couts v. Acworth, 8 Eq. 558; Everitt v. Everitt, 10 Eq. 405; 
Garsney v. Mundy, 24 N. J. Eq. 243; Rick's Appeal, 105 Pa. 528. These cases 
were cases of unusual hardship, however, in which the donor might have 
been relieve4 without recourse to so dubious a principle. Compare Massey 
v. Huntington, n8 Ill. 8o. It has sometimes been said that the omission 
from a voluntary disposition in trust of a clause reserving a power of revo-
cation raises a presumption that it was omitted by mistake. See Russelfs 
Appeal, 75 Pa. 26g; Aylsworth v. Whitcomb, I2 R. I. 298. But such state-
ments are believed to be unsound on principle and opposed to the weight of 
authority. See Sands v. Old Colons Trust Co., 195 Mass. 575; Souverbvc 
v. Arden, I Johns. Ch. 240. 
It may be urged, of course, with some plaui:ibility, that the evidence in 
the instant case, although meager, indicated more than anything else an 
intention to make a gift in tn1st for the eldest son at the donor's death ip. 
case the donor died without revoki1,1g. This construction appeals to the 
present writer as a very dubious one. ·Why imply a power of revocation in 
an executed gift to one to be held "in the event of the donor's death" in 
trust for another? Nothing is more certain than death. The qualifying 
clause is an appropriate way of indicating the time at which the beneficiary's 
interest is to commence. Why attribute to it any greater significance? Com-
pai:e Massey v. Huntington, n8 Ill. 80; Viney v. Abbott, 109 Mass. 300. 
Probably the case should be viewed as another manifestation of a somewhat 
curious reluctance to commit irrevocably one who has made a volunt2ry 
declaration or transfer in trust. So regarded the principle of the decision 
seems clearly objectionable. The only authority cited by the Court, Sterling 
v. Wilkinson, 83 Va. 791, was really a case of imperfect gift which the court 
could not perfect after the donor's death, and anything said about implied 
power of revocation seems to have been mere dictum. Everyone would 
agree at the present day that equity has taken a sound position in refusing 
to give effect to imperfect gifts. But has not the pendulum swung too far 
when revocability is implied as readily as in the instant case? It would be 
unfortunate if pawnship equity should be permitted to impair the stability 
of gifts in trust. R. E G. 
ANmALs-DAMAGJO;s DY T!msPASSING CHICKl!Ns.-P alleged he had a 
large feed barn, filled with grain, and a garden with growing vegetables, on 
his lot surrounded by a lawful fence four and one-half feet high, over which 
some of D's 400 chickens crossed from her adjoining lot, and destroyed grain 
and vegetable& to the value of $6oo. The trial court sustained D's demurrer. 
Reversed. Adams Bros. v. Clark (1920), - Ky.-, 224 S. W. 1?46. 
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The court says: "By the common law of England the owner of domes-
tic animals, including fowls, was required to keep them on his own prem-
ises, and was liable for their trespass on the lands of another." This common 
law, as it was in 1007 (4 James 1), was the common ·1aw of Virginia, and 
later, when the State of Kentucky was formed, by constitutional provision 
became the common law of that state. 
The court also said that while a statute provided "no recovery could be 
had for the destruction of property [by trespassing animals], unless it was 
surrounded by a fence four and one-half feet high, so close that cattle could 
not creep through," applied to cattle, and had not changed the common law 
as to fowls. Also, that the storing of grain on P's premises was not an 
attractive nuisance and an invitation to D's chickens to enter and eat thereof. 
A pathetic argument was made on behalf of the chicken owner that she 
was -trying to bring down the high cost of living for her family. by engaging 
in the chicken industry. The court, however, thought the plaintiff's efforts 
to bring down the high cost of living of his family by raising garden truck 
was equally commendable, and he should not be expected to feed his neigh-
bor• s chickens also. 
The court cites several cases involving horses, cattle, and hogs. The 
only fowl cases cited are State v. Bmner (1887), III Ind. <}3, to the effect 
that a fowl is an animal within the statutes relating to cruelty to animals; 
and McP!ierso1i v. James (1896), 6g Ill. App. 337, holding that the owner of 
turkeys is liable for damages in trespass on a neighbor's unfenced property, 
although not for a penalty for allowing them to stray, under statute naming 
certain domestic animals, but not turkeys. 
That a fowl is an animal within cruelty and similar statutes is generally 
held. Holcomb v. Van .Zylen (1913), 174 Mich. 274, Ann. Cas. 1915 A 1241, 
with note. 
There are very few cases holding that the owners of trespassing fowls 
are liable for the damages they do; most of the cases are those holding that 
the person on whose property they trespass has no right to kill them. JC1!in-
son v. Patterso1i (1840), 14 Conn. l (poisoning trespassing chickens, defend-
ant liable); Matthews v. Fiestel (1853), 2 E. D. Smith, N. Y. go (poisoning 
trespassing geese); Clark v. Kelilier (1871), 107 Mass. 4o6, 409 (no right 
to kill trespassing chickens); Reis v. Stratton (1887), 23 nt. App. 314; State 
v. Porter (18g3), II2 N. C. 887 (killing trespassing pigeons is cruelty to 
animals) ; State v. Neal (18g7), 120 N. C. 613 (trespassing chickens could 
be impounded at common law, and needlessly killing them is cruelty to ani-
mals); James v. Tindall (1913), 27 Del. 413. 
In Taylor v. Gra11ger (1896), 19 R. I. 410, it was held that case instead 
of trespass was the proper action where a city negligently atlowed the pigeons 
from one of its parks to fly over and defile plaintiff's premises and annoy 
him by the noise. In Lapp v. Staiito1i (19n), u6 Md. 197, an allegation in 
an action of trespass that defendant's game chickens continually trespassed 
on plaintiff's premises, roosted in his shed and on his new wagons and plows, 
etc., to his damage, was held to be sufficient on demurrer. · 
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It was early held in Missouri, Iowa, and many other states that the 
common law relating to trespassing cattle was not suited to their condition, 
and was not in force in those states. Gormcm v. Pacific R., 26 Mo. 441; Wag-
ner v. Bissell, 3 Ia. 3g6. In such states there are fencing statutes that affect 
the subject materially. See note 3, BL. Coi.rn:. 2n [Lewis's Ed.]. 
In Evans v. McLalin (1915), 189 Mo. App. 310, where a farmer's chick-
ens were alleged to have trespassed and destroyed a neighbor's crops, a 
demurrer was sustained, and the owner of the chickens was held not liable. 
This is based on the statute, and although directly in conflict with the prin-
cipal case, admits the common law to be as ruled in that case. 
In Keil v. Wright (1907), 135 Ia. 383, an injunction was asked against 
the owner of chickens which repeatedly trespassed on plaintiff's premises 
and destroyed his crops. The defendant denied the facts, and claimed that, 
since he was solvent, an action at law would be an adequate remedy. The 
trial court found for the plaintiff and granted the injunction. In the supreme 
court the defendant, in argument, urged that "chickens were commoners" 
and had a right to roam at will without being considered trespassers. The 
court refused to rule on, this, since it was not pleaded nor considered by the 
trial court, and so affirmed the decision of that court. Six years later, in 
Kimple v. Seba.fer (1913), 161 Ia. 659, relying on the Keil case, plaintiff 
asked an injunction to ·restrain the defendant from permitting his 200- chick-
ens to trespass on plaintiff's land and .eat the oats he had planted there to 
such an extent that he was obliged to resow it two or three times. The 
defendant pleaded that "chickens were free commoners, and that the owners 
of cultivated land must fence against them.''; that plaintiff had no lawful 
fence enclosing his land; and that his remedy, if any, was impounding or 
suing for damages. The court, by Deemer, ]., affirms the Keil case and 
holds that an injunction will lie to prevent domestic animals from trespass-
ing. He also says that at common law the owner must keep his domestic 
animals at home; that trespass would lie for failure to do so; that the ani-
mals could be impounded; that these rules were early held inapplicable in 
Iowa; that the matter was now regulated by statute, in reference to several 
kinds of domestic animals ; that nothing had been done as to chickens, except 
in cities, indicating that i11J the country chickens are free commoners, and 
they, turkeys, ducks, geese, peacocks, and guinea hens have been so consid-
ered from the beginning of the state; that it is much easier to fence poultry 
out than to fence it in; and that until the legislature made it obligatory the 
court would not adopt a rule requiring the owner to fence them in, nor 
enjoin him from permitting them to escape. 
In all these cases it is assumed that the common law allowed an action 
for damages, or distress damage feasant, for injuries done by trespassing 
domestic animals. This is undoubtedly true as to horses, cattle, sheep, and 
hogs. Yet by the laws of Ine (c. 69o), if a ceorl's close "be unfenced and 
his neighbor's cattle stray in through his own gap, he shall have nothing 
from the cattle; let him drive it out and bear the damage; but if there be 
a beast which breaks hedges and goes in everywhere, and he who owns it 
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will not or cannot restrain it, let him who finds it in his field take it out 
and slay it, and let the owner take its skin and flesh, and forfeit the rest." 
Lt. 40, 42. The Welsh law was similar. I THoRPJ>'s ANC!SNT LAWS AND 
INST. 127. 
In the year books of Ed. II (1307-1326) there are numerous cases of 
replevin for cattle taken damage feasant, indicating that it was a common 
remedy at that time; and in Boyden- v. Alspath (13o8), Y. B. 2 Ed. II, 87, 
pl. 29, a trespassing ferret might be taken damage feasant; also a greyhound. 
De la More v. Thwi11g (13o8), Y. B. 2 Ed. II, 176, pl. !)Sa. In 1481, Y. B. 
20 Ed. IV, fo. 1ob, where D had common in 200 acres of land adjoining P's 
land, and D's beasts entered P's unenclosed land without D's knowledge, 
being driven there by wild dogs, and did damage, Brian, C. J., and Littleton, 
J., held D was liable in trespass for the damage done, and the fact that the 
wild dogs chased the cattle there made no difference. A hundred years later 
the law was stated the same, relying on this case. Dyer, 372, pl. 10 (1581). 
It seems the law has been thus since that time as to trespassing cattle, those 
dangerous to crop&. There seem to be no chicken cases in England. 
In the Welsh law above referred to it was said : "The owner must make 
his garden so strong that beasts cannot break into it; and if it be broken 
into there can be no redress, except for the trespass of poultry and geese.'' 
I THORP£, 127, note. 
In Boulton's Case (1597), 5 Co. 1046, it was stated that one was not 
liable for making a dove-cot from which the pigeons trespassed on the neigh-
bor's land. This, however, was said to be contrary to Y. B. 4 H. VI, pl. 10, 
and 27 Ass., pl. 6; and in Dewell v. Smiders (1619), Cro. Jae. 492, 79 Eng. 
Rep. 41g, Doderidge, Croke, and Houghton, ]J., agreed that if pigeons come 
upon my land I may kill them, and the owner has no remedy. Montague, J., 
held contra, for the owner has a property in the pigeons. In Taylor v. 
Ne--..vman (1863), 4 B. & S. 89, 122 Eng. Rep. 343, the Dewell case was 
affirmed. And in Webb v. ;'lfrFeai (1878), 22 Jour. Juris. (Sc.) 66g, the 
owner of a carrier pigeon was held to have no remedy when it was killed 
by D's cat, both the pigeon and the cat trespassing on neutral ground at the 
time. So in McDonald v. Godfrey (18go), 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 142, the plaintiff 
had no remedy for the killing of his canary, on his own premises_. by the 
defendant's trespassing cat. 
On the other hand, in Ferrer v. Nelson (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 258, Pollock, 
J., held that one was liable in case for overstocking his land with 1,500 
pheasants so that 300 of them trespassed on plaintiff's premises and injured 
his crops. In Hadwell v. RightC1n (1907), 76 L. J. (K. B.) 891, where a 
bicyclist was injured by a fowl flying into his wheel, in the road, the court 
seemed to think that the owner of the chicken might have been liable if it 
had been trespassing at the time. 
In Boulton's Case, above, it was held that overstocking D's ground with 
rabbits, which strayed on P's premises and did damage, did not make D 
liable, for P might kill them. This is contrary to the Ferrer case, above. 
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Compare Stearn v. Prentice (I9I8), 68 L. J. (K. B.) 422 (defendant not 
liable for the depredations of rats harbored in his boneyard). 
It is generally held that one is not liable for the mere trespass of his 
dog, not known to be dangerous to persons ; ordinarily, of course, a dog is 
not dangerous to crops. Brou>n v. Giles (I823), I Car. & P., 28 R.R. 76g; 
Woolf v. Chalker (I862), 3I Conn. I2I, I28; Read v. Edwards (I864). I7 
Com. B. N. S. 245; Sander v. Teape (IS84), Q. B., 5I L. T. N. S. 263; 
Buchanan v. Sweet (I!)08), Io8 N. Y. S. 38; Van Etten v. Noyes (Igo8), 
II2 N. Y: S. 888; Doyle v. Vance (I88o), 6 Viet. L. R. 87, contra. 
Similar rulings have been made as to deer, Keilway, 30, Y. B. IO Hen. 
VII, 6, pl. I2 (1495) ; Brady v. Warren [1900], 2 I. R. 632, 66I; State v. 
Ward, I70 Ia. I85; and as to bees, Brown v. Eckes, I6o N. Y. S. 48g; Earl 
v. Va1i Alstine (I858), 8 Barb. 630; O'Gorman v. O'Gorman [1903], 2 I. R. 
573. 
Of course, fowls may become a nuisance because of the dust, odor, or 
noise they cause. Ireland v. Smith (I8g5), 3 Sc. L. T. Rep.-, 33 Scot L 
R. 156; Desmond v. Smith, 9 Gm;r.N BAG, 550, 41 Sol. J. 167. 
It is submitted the common law, as set forth in the principal case, should 
be considered the correct rule, where damage is done by any such animals 
in the exercise of their welt-known natural propensities, unless due to the 
intervening act of God or the independent act of some third party, or similar 
excuse. See "Responsibility at Common Law for Keeping Animals," 
THOMAS BJWEN, 22 HARV. L. Rr:v. 465; RoBsoN, ~SPASS BY ANIMALS. 
H.L. W. 
FuTURS INT~sTS IN RJ,:cENT STATUTES AND CAsts-REMAINDERS, DEVISES 
AND Usr:s.-To the layman, or the beginner in the study of property law, 
the intricat~ sinuosities of Shelley's Case and Archer's 'Case, of contingent 
remainders and their destructibility, of indestructible executory devises and 
uses, springing and shifting, seem inexplicable, incomprehensible, and use-
less-. But a longer estate than for the life of him who must perform the 
feudal services on which his tenure rested is a concept that would have 
seemed equally strange and impossible either to lay or legal mind when 
feudalism was in fullest flower. Pure feudalism had no room for future 
estates, but only for present holdings, based on present services, to be per-
formed by the present tenant while he lived. An estate to A was not an 
estate· for A to pass to another, either inter vivos or at death, hut to keep, 
and only while he performed the personal services that went with it. When 
estates to A and his heirs came to be recognized the concept was stilt of a 
life estate to A, and "to his heirs" merely indicated that at the end' of A's life 
the estate in natural course would go to him who should be his heir, and so 
on: in indefinite succession. IS CoL. L. RJ,:v. 68o. · 
It was a sign that feudalism was already beginning to crumble when it 
began to be suggested that an estate might be created carrying a present 
interest in A and a future interest in his heirs, and the development of the 
concept was a long process. It is more than possible that the rule in Shel-
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ley's Case had never been if the first appearance of the principle now 
known by that name (in 1324) had not preceded by more than a century 
the recognition of the possibility of a destructible contingent remainder (in 
1430). See Lord Macnaghten in Van Grutten v. Fo~ell [189i], App. Cas. 
658. For if the remainder to the heirs of A in Shelley's Case had been 
treated as a contingent remainder after A's death, and therefore destructible 
by A in his life, free alienability by A would have been secured without 
executing in him and adding to his life estate, as under the Rule in Shelley's 
Case, the remainder expressly limited to his heirs. 
But feudalism. and its fruits have long been gone. It might be supposed 
that the reason for the law having ceased, the law itself would have dis-
appeared. Quite otherwise. Indeed, Lord Macnaghten's remark in the case 
referred to, that the subject "rarely comes up for discussion nowadays," is 
not justified by an examination of the recent reports. They are full of 
cases involving contingent remainders, Shelley's Case, Archers Case, etc., 
not merely in such a state as Illinois, where they are most exuberant and 
intricate; Moore v. Reddel, 259 Ill. 36; Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hoppin, 214 
Fed. 928 (a 1914 Illinois case), but in many other states as well. The cases 
show we must say rather "the reason of the law having changed, the law 
has changed also," but curiously enough, almost always by _statute, not by 
court decision. And the statutes hark back to the old phrases and terminol-
ogy and the old rules, so that one can understand the language of the new 
rule only by a thorough study of the old cases. In England at least three 
attempts have been made to do away with the frailty of contingent remain-
ders, and not yet is it completely gone. A comprehensive statute was enacted 
in 7 & 8 V1c::r., c. i6, s. 8, but it seems to have so affrighted the conveyancers, 
see 30 HARV. L. REv. 227 ff., that it was repealed and a new statute enacted 
the next year, 8 & 9 V1c::r., c. 1o6. This cured so little that thirty years later 
the Contingent Remainders Act of 1877, 40 & 41 Vrc::r., c. 33, was enacted, 
which partly restored 7 & 8 V1c::r., but left some cases unprotected. 
We may compare a Massachusetts and an Illinois statute. The latter is 
not free from references to "supposed rules," and to "double possibilities," 
a much talked of and utterly repudiated term, but it is comparatively simple, 
and attempts in sweeping terms to resolve contingent remainders to present 
day need·s, to make such a rule as we may suppose would have been adopted 
' if defunct feudal institutions had never been. MASS. Giw. Ac:rs, 1916, c: 1o8, 
provides that "a contingent remainder shall take effect, notwithstanding any 
determination of the particular estate (Cf. 8 & 9 V1c::r., above), in the same 
manner in which it would have taken effect if it had been an executory devise 
or a springing or shifting use (Cf. 7 & 8 V1c::r., repealed by 8 & 9 V1c::r.), 
and shall, as well as such limitations, be subject to the rule respecting remote-
ness known as the rule against perpetuities, exclusively of any other sup-
posed rule respecting limitations to successive generations or double possi-
bilities." How impossible an und·erstanding of the language of this statute, 
without a knowledge of the ancient estates and their history I To one who 
understands, the last clause shows an intent to bring the Massachusetts law 
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to the position contended for by Professor Gray in his attack on Whitby v. 
Mitchell, 42 Ch. 494. 44 Ch. 85, GRAY RUL£ AGAINST PJ;RPETUITI£S, Appendix 
K, and the lively dispute there referred to between the author and Mr. 
Charles Sweet, 30 HARV. L. Rsv. 226. The Massachusetts- statute in effect 
abolishes contingent remainders, and resolves them, if they are limitations 
in a will, to executory devises ; if in a deed, to springing or shifting uses. 
They are thus transformed, supposedly in accordance with the intent of the 
devisor or grantor, from d'estructible contingent remainders into indestruc-
tible devises or uses.• Freedom of alienation is preserved by subjecting them 
to the same rule against perpetuities that was invented to check executory 
devises and springing' and shifting uses, i. e., future estate& cannot be limited 
to ·take effect beyond a life or lives in being and twenty-one years. This 
common law period is the rule in Massachusetts. Millot v. Paine, 230 Mass. 
514 (1918); Gray v. Whittemore, 192 Mass. 36i (1916). If this period is 
too long to tie up land the remedy is for the legislature. 
The Illinois statute referred to is Rsv. ST. 1874 c. 30, s. 6: "In cases 
where, by the common law, any person or persons might hereafter become 
seized, in fee tail, of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, by virtue of 
any devise, gift, grant or other conveyance, hereafter to be made, or by any 
other means whatsoever, such person or persons, instead' of being or becom-
ing seized thereof in fee tail, shall be deemed and adjudged to be and become 
seized thereof, for his or her natural life only, and the remainder shall pass 
in fee simple absolute to the person or persons to whom the estate would, 
on the death of the first grantee, devisee or donee in tail, first pass, according 
to the course of the common law, by virtue of such devise, gift, grant or 
conveyance." Here again to one not steeped in the ancient law the language 
is meaningless. Its labored language in terms of the law of the past required 
the impossible. In Illinois primogeniture had been abrogated. Property could 
not "pass according to the course of the common law" to the eldest son, but 
must be distributed among all the heirs of the first taker. In I Ir.r.. L. Rsv. 
322 ff., Mr. Kales has well pointed out that the court has made over the 
statute by high-handed construction. Moore v. Riddel, 259 Ill. 36. As made 
over, it ties up the land for one generation at least as the feudal lords in 
vain tried to do by the Statute de Donis, for it gives a life estate to the first 
taker, with remainder in fee to persons not born perhaps till near the death of 
the life tenant. That makes it possible to tie up the Marshall Field estate 
for possibly seventy-five years from the death of the owner, a serious clog 
upon alienation in a country changing so fast as ours. There seems urgent 
need of a shortened period for the rule against perpetuities, but so firmly 
is the old law upon us that no courts and few statutes have cut down the 
period. New York, followed by Michigan and some other states, has fixed 
the limit at two lives in being. This has some things to commend it, though 
Mr. Gray finds in the increase of litigation in New York serious objections. 
GRAY, RUL.£ AGAINST P.£RP.£TUITm5, Sec. 749 ff. 
The clumsy Illinois statute doubtless was intended merely to abolish 
estates tail. This could have been done by giving to the life tenant an estate 
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in fee simple absolute, or with contingent remainder over to the heirs. Twice 
at least a fairly simple draft of a bill intended" to do that has been submitted 
to the Illinois legislature, but the old law stands. 
In the centuries old contest over future estates there have been two lead-
ing and conflicting ideas, intent and freedom of alienation, action and reac-
tion on which have molded the law of future estates. To give effect to the 
intent of the testator Lord Mansfield pronounced his famous, or infamous, 
opinion in Perrin v. Blake, I W. Bl. 672, and precipitated the fierce and 
humorous contest so entertainingly described in 3 CAMPBELL'S Liviis oF THE 
Jus'l'xc:es, 305. In lesson v. Wright, 2 Bligh I, Lord Eldon emphasized free-
dom of alienation, and brought the rule back to a rule of law to be rigidly 
applied, even though defeating intent. He assumed to regard the general as 
distinguished from the particular intent, but would have done better to agree 
with Lord Redesdale in sticking to the law defeating intent. As Cockburn, 
C. J., put it in Jordan v. Adams, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 483, "the fatal words once 
used" the law "inexorably and despotically fixes on the donor" all the con-
sequences of bringing his provisions within the rule, "although, all the while, 
it may be as clear as the sun at noonday that by such a construction the 
intention of the testator is violated in every particular." As to contingent 
remainders, the Massachusetts act very sensibly allows free play to intent 
for a period by preserving them from the destruction that might have been 
their fate at common law. Beyond that period the restrictions cannot operate; 
indeed, the limitations must not try to tie up beyond, or they are void in 
their inception. Such in a general way is the effect of the various provisions 
of the Michigan statutes, C. I.,. 1915, c. 220, and of such a code as that oi 
Georgia, CoD:e of 19n, Sixth Title, c. 3. 
The importance of the ancient rules and the history of their develop-
ment have been touched upon. The digests show how constantly cases are 
before the courts, and seem to justify the statutes that have tried to modify 
the rules to suit present day needs, for 111inois, which has refused to make 
many changes, shows an unrest and dissatisfaction to such an extent as to 
give color to the claim that she has as many cases as all the other states 
together. The three latest bound volumes of the Illinois reports illustrate 
the fact that under the old: rules one can hardly be sure what kind of a 
future estate he has in hand until the supreme court has pronounced, not 
once merely, but for the last time. Not only do the lawyers differ, which i~ 
to be expected if the opposing sides are to have counsel, and the judges dis-
agree, which is not unusual, but the same court on consideration at different 
times of the same instrument is not unlikely to reach different conclusions. 
See, for example, Cutler v. Garber, 28g Ill. 200 (Oct., 1919), finding the 
future interests to be executory, which in 26r 111. 378 had been held to be 
contingent remainders. Under the Massachusetts statute this would have 
made no difference. In 292 Ill. attention may be called to Cole v. Cole, in 
which, at page 170, the old doctrine of destruction of contingent remainders 
by merger is held to be still flourishing, and to Bender v. Bender, at page 
363, where the contingent remainderman, there also a reversioner, is recog-
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nized as having an interest which he may protect by suit. This latter is 
touched' upon in Die Bois v. Judy, 291 Ill. 340, in which the court attacks as 
though they were new in the state the property problems of the case, stating 
in full the rule in Shelley's Case, defining remainders, and laying down the 
law as to the destructibility of contingent remainders which has hardly been 
doubted since C/mdleigh's Case, I Co. 12oa. In Gray v. Shinn, 293" Ill. 573 
(June, 1920), the court feels called upon again to define contingent and 
vested remainders, and announces the well-known fact that a contingent 
remainder falls with the death of the life tenant before the vesting of the 
remainder, page 579, as it would not if Illinois had the modem statute, and 
Cf. Lewiti v. Bell, 285 Ill. 227. At 293 Ill. 581, it is pointed out that there 
is no rule to prevent voluntary destruction of contingent remainders by a 
conveyance for that express purpose by the life tenant to a third person to 
bring about a merger. But shottld there not be such a rule, coupled with a 
rule against ·remoteness? It is for the legislature to say. Litigants seem to 
want it, for the interesting thing is not so much that the courts should again 
and again restate these elementary matters as though they were new and 
not centuries old, but that there should seem to be such repeated and per-
sistent refusal to accept the rules. The court contents itself, as probably it 
must, with a restatement of the oft stated rules. Change in a rule of prop-
erty so long acted upon should ~e made by the legislature, and then not 
retroactively, but Illinois refuses to Change, though curiously enough agita-
tion there has been more insistent than elsewhere. See l ILL. t. Ri>v. 3u. 
In addition to the above cases, see Sellers v. Rike, 292 Ill. 468, fully stating 
the Rule in Shelley's Case and rigidly applying it, though it overrides intent. 
Noth v. Noth, 292 Ill. 536, dealing with an executory devise and an expec-
tancy; McBride v. Clepions (Ill., June, 1920), 128 N. E. 283, holding a lim-
itation to be an executory devise anc:? indestructible, and not a destructible 
contingent remainder; and Biwer v. Martin (Itt., October, 1920), 128 N. E. 
518, applying the common law rule as to destruction of contingent remain-
ders by merger, and the modified rule as to conveyance of such remainders 
by way of an estoppel or r:elease. Cf. Kenwood Trust & Savings Bank v. 
Palmer, 285 Ill. 552, holding a contingent remainder cannot be the subject 
of sale, as it could be in Michigan and other states where it i9 alienable, 
descendible and devisable. Graff v. Rankin, 250 Fed. 150, may be cited as 
a recent case in which the Federal court applied the Illinois law to contin-
gent remainders in a devise to one "Illinois Riggs and her lawful issue," 
with certain added limitations. Truly, this was an Illinois case, and the 
peculiar thing about many of the above cases is that if the Illinois law had 
been changed the questions in dispute would not have arisen. 
In other states there still are, and no doubt always must be, cases on 
future interests, even in those that have done most to square the law with 
present day conditions and desires. Jn. Troll v. Tarbell (May, 1920), 127 N. 
E. 541, the Massachusetts court construed interests as vested in preference 
to contingent. The Michigan statute as to perpetuities had: to be construed 
in Cary v. Toles, 210 Mich. 30 (April, 1920), and Woolfit v. Preston, 203 
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Mich. 502 (Dec., 1918). The Michigan court is justified in its position in 
In re Blodgett's Estate, 197 Mich. 455, that full force may be given to intent, 
since the statute has relieved contingent remainders of their common law 
infirmities, and by proper restrictions has protected the public against the 
perpetuities that might result. The law favors vested estates, but will rec-
ognize others where the intent to create them is clear. It does not favor 
joint tenancies, but nevertheless permits them. The language to create con-
tingent remainders must, however, be plain and unambiguous. In re Shum-
way's Estate, 194 Mich. 245. That such language may be held by a trial judge 
and by the Supreme Court to sho\v clearly two perfectly opposite things 
appears in Colby v. Wortley, 205 Mich. 6og. Expectant estates having been 
made descendible, devisable, and alienable, it matters less than formerly 
whether estates are vested or contingent, but there are still vital distinctions. 
This note is already too long to permit further detailed notice of cases. 
The present importance in all jurisdictions of problems of future interests 
is suggested by the following list of very recent cases which the curious may 
examine. Alabama, Deremus v. Deremus, 85 So. 397 (Feb., 1920); Georgia, 
Cock v. Lipsey, g6 S. E. 628 (Aug., 1918); Kansas, Moherman v. Anthony, 
188 Pac. 434 (March, 1920); Maine, Real Estate, etc., Co. v. Dearborn., 109 
Atl. 816 (April, 1920); Carver v. Wright, 109 Atl. 8g6 (May, 1920); Mary-
land, Hempel v. Hall, IIO Atl. 210 (Feb., 1920); Mississippi, City Savings 
Bank, etc., v. Cortwright, 84 So. 136 (April, 1920); Missouri, Bramhall v. 
Bramhall, 216 S. W. 766 (Dec., 1919) : Hartnett v. Langan, 222 S. W. 403 
(June, 1920); Nebraska, Yates v. Yates, 178 N. W. 262 (June, 1920); New 
York, In re Tift, l8o N. Y. S. 884 (Feb., 1920); Montague v. Curtis, 181 N. 
Y. S. 709 (March, 1920); U. S. Trust Co. v. Perr~!, 183 N. Y. S. 426 (July, 
1920); Ohio, In re Youtsey, 26o Fed. 423 (March, 1916); Oregon, Lee v. 
Albro, 178 Pac. 784 (Feb., 1919) ; Pennsylvania, Berkley v. Berkle31, 109 Atl. 
686 (Feb., 1920); In re McConnell's Estate, 109 Atl. 846 (Feb., 1920); In re 
Groninger's Estate, no Atl. 465 (June, 1920); Rhode Island, Aldrich v. 
Aldrich, no Atl. 626 (July, 1920); South Carolina, Home Bank v. Fox-, 102 
S. E. 643 (March, 1920); Texas, Crist v. Morgan, 219 S. W. 276 (March, 
1920); Virginia, Turner v. Monteiro, 103 S. E. 572 (June, 1920); Prince v. 
Barham, 103 S. E, 626 (June, 1920). 
This brief study justifies the claim that the common· law rules as to 
future interests are quite inconsistent with the legislative policy of England 
and the United States. Where the old rules have not been changed litigants 
are constantly objecting. In the states that have changed most appears com-
parative quiet. The lesson, if lesson there be, is that statutes should give free-
dom to intent in creating futures estates, and preserving them when created, 
but at the same time preserve freedom of alienation by cutting down, per-
haps more than has yet been done, the period of perpetuities. With such 
statutes the Rule in Shelley's Case, Clmdleigh's Case, P1irefoy v. Rogers, 
and the rest, could be filed away as curios, and the law of real property and 
modem needs and desires could dwell together in harmony. E. C. G. 
